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Abstract 
Residential consumers remain reluctant to choose new electricity suppliers. Even the most 
successful jurisdictions, four U.S. states and other countries, have had to adopt extensive consumer 
education procedures that serve largely to confirm that choosing electricity suppliers is daunting. 
Electricity is not unique in this respect; numerous studies find that consumers are generally reluctant to 
switch brands, even when they are well-informed about product characteristics. If consumers prefer not to 
choose, opening regulated markets can reduce welfare, even for some consumers who do switch, as the 
incumbent can exploit this preference by raising price above the formerly regulated level. Policies to open 
markets might be successful even if limited to industrial and commercial customers, with residential 
prices based on those in nominally competitive wholesale markets.  
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Consumer Preference Not to Choose: Methodological and Policy 
Implications  
Timothy J. Brennan∗
“What if they gave a war and nobody came? 
Life would ring the bells of Ecstasy and Forever be Itself again.” 
Allen Ginsberg, “Graffiti” 
 
I. Introduction 
At the residential level, retail competition in the electricity sector has failed to match the 
growth of competition at the wholesale level. Specifically, although industrial and commercial 
customers have shown willingness to shop and switch, with rare exceptions, residential 
consumers in the United States have shown little interest in choosing electricity from a supplier 
other than the incumbent. This reluctance may be why half the states have not adopted retail 
choice. It has also engendered efforts to cope with failures of consumers to make choices, e.g., 
identify and set rules for default service. Much of the effort of bringing competition to this 
segment of the market has focused not on individual consumers but on markets to be the default 
service provider.  
The leading explanation for the general lack of consumer choice is that the political 
package to enact retail competition typically has included cuts in the incumbent’s retail prices 
below already-regulated levels. Such cuts discourage competition by reducing the profitability of 
entry. Other explanations include the inability of competitors to offer differentiated products or 
convince consumers that they will offer reliable service. 
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Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future. E-mail the author at brennan@umbc.edu. He would like to thank Rajnish 
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These reasons are amenable to conventional economic analysis and accordingly have 
received considerable attention. Less attention has been given to the possibility that consumers 
prefer a lack of choice.1 As the benefit of expanding choice sets is fundamental in theoretical 
modeling, a willingness to pay not to choose raises profound questions about how or even 
whether retail residential electricity choice can be viewed in efficiency or cost/benefit terms. Our 
objective is to examine the methodological implications of preferring not to choose and suggest 
approaches policymakers might apply to evaluate the worthiness of expanding markets. We 
might be better off declaring victory by leaving retail choice to industrial and large commercial 
customers.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II looks at the record of retail electricity 
competition in the best national and domestic state jurisdictions, as rated by the Center for the 
Advancement of Electricity Markets (CAEM) “Retail Electricity Deregulation” or RED Index.2 
Section III discusses the theoretical rationales for the observed reluctance to choose and contains 
a model where the fixed costs of having to choose can cause a welfare loss for both consumers 
who elect to remain with the incumbent provider and some of those who switch to an entrant. 
Section IV reviews some of the policy commentary on the observed reluctance of consumers to 
switch. Section V concludes with a summary and recommendations for both policy and 
methodology. 
 
II. Looking at the “Best” Jurisdictions 
One might think that a commodity as homogenous and familiar as electricity would be 
readily amenable to residential choice. One can think of milk or gasoline as ready examples. 
Reviewing the retail electricity market experience provides some insight into how electricity 
does not appear to match those other commodities in that amenability. To see this, we look at the 
best cases. We define “best” as the seven highest-rated jurisdictions in CAEM’s most recent 
                                                 
1 Wilson and Price (2005) offer empirical findings from the British residential electricity markets indicating that 
more choice may make consumers worse off not because they prefer not to choose but that more choices lead to 
more errors. Their findings complement those here, in that both consumers may prefer not to have more choices 
because they realize that they will, as Wilson and Price (2003, 3) “suffer an ‘information-overload’ due to the higher 
decision complexity resulting from an increased number of options.” We differ from Wilson and Price in claiming 
that if consumers find choice complex and therefore costly, their preference for fewer choices is not “irrational.” 
2 In the interest of disclosure and not necessarily full endorsement, the author has served on CAEM’s advisory 
committee for the RED Index. 
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“Retail Electricity Deregulation” Index, for April 2003 (Treadway and Malloy 2003).3 The top 
two are countries: Britain and New Zealand. The list also includes the Canadian province of 
Alberta, along with four U.S. states: Texas, Pennsylvania, Maine, and New York.  
A. International Examples 
England.4 By most comparisons, the English retail experience appears to be fairly 
successful, justifying its CAEM ranking of 88, substantially above that of New Zealand’s 
second-place 75.5 The main way entrants attract customers is from door-to-door sales.6 To help 
consumers choose among suppliers, compare prices, answer questions, and resolve complaints, 
the Department of Trade, under the Minister of Energy, has created a consumer advocacy 
organization, Energywatch. According to the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), 
the British energy regulator, consumers do switch primarily for lower prices, but that they do not 
always choose the least expensive supplier, despite limited differentiation. As of 2004, more than 
half of electricity customers had switched suppliers, although some had switched back to the 
incumbent retail utility. Stephen Littlechild, Director General of Electricity Supply from 1989 to 
1998, has attributed the success of the English experience to full separation of competitive 
generation from monopoly distribution and transmission, as distinguished from limited 
“functional unbundling”—that is, rules for separate operations that nonetheless keep these stages 
within the same corporation, which prevails in the United States (Littlechild 2005).  
                                                 
3 The “RED” index is a weighted average of 22 attributes of electricity markets applied to states, Canadian 
provinces, three Australian states, England, Wales, and New Zealand. The attributes pertain to facets of the retail 
competition institutions, generation markets, consumer protection, distribution regulation, and regulatory 
commissions. The factors getting the most weight are anti-favoritism safeguards, standardized business practices, 
generation market structure, liberalization of the wholesale market, and the limited marketplace role for regulated 
default service.  
4 Information in this section is from Energywatch, “How to Change Supplier,” http://www.energywatch 
.org.uk/help_and_advice/how_to_change_supplier/index.asp; Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), 
“Competition in Gas and Electricity Supply—Separating Fact from Fiction” (Jan. 29, 2002), http://www.ofgem 
.gov.uk/temp/ofgem/cache/cmsattach/993_factsheet0102_29jan.pdf; and OFGEM, “Energy Competition Working 
for Customers: The State of Competition in Domestic Gas and Electricity Supply” (Apr. 5, 2004), http://www.ofgem 
.gov.uk/temp/ofgem/cache/cmsattach/6702_factsheet40_april04.pdf, all accessed Apr. 12, 2005. 
5 By comparison, CAEM’s average score for the United States in the last RED Index was 17. 
6 Colin Loxley characterized this door-to-door marketing effort as “a disaster” and attributed the relative success of 
residential competition in England to the dual-fuel sales discounts described below. 
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As of April 2004, even in this best case, 60 percent of customers were still using the 
incumbent, despite the possibility of saving up to £75 for a “dual-fuel deal.”7 When they do not 
switch, it is because “they do not wish to, rather than because they are wary of or unaware of the 
opportunities competition offers.” Using survey data, OFGEM found in 2002 that it would take 
savings of 28 percent (£72) to induce switching of this magnitude (OFGEM 2002, 23, based on a 
2001 working paper by Waterson published in 2003). Even with the more recent successes, 
OFGEM finds that prepayment customers are switching at less than expected rates.8
New Zealand. New Zealand, the second-ranked country, appears to have a retail 
switching rate somewhat under England’s; a variety of sources suggest that it is around 25 
percent.9 New Zealand’s experience begins to illustrate some of the difficulties residential 
consumers seem to face in switching suppliers. To provide consumers with some assistance, 
New Zealand’s Consumer Institute, a product-testing and advocacy organization similar to the 
Consumers’ Union in the United States, provides an online “Powerswitch” Web site to guide 
consumers through the retail electricity forest,10 beginning with a three-page, instructional guide 
on how to interpret pricing plans and answers to frequently asked questions.  
The site’s main feature is a multi-page step-by-step worksheet, which works consumers 
through their choices by asking them questions on (i) location, (ii) numbers in the household, 
(iii) whether people are home during the week, (iv) type of home and water heating, and (v) 
eligibility for discounts. If one has usage data from a bill, the site will use that in calculating 
                                                 
7 England has opened retail gas markets as well. 
8 Prepayment customers apparently are those that pay for electricity in advance, rather than either through automatic 
debit or after the fact by check. Prepayment customers typically have low incomes and lack bank accounts. 
Prepayment customers typically pay more for electricity than either automatic debit or subsequent payment 
customers. Why is not clear, since presumably the risk of nonpayment disappears with prepayment. National Energy 
Action, “Prepayment Meters” (updated March 2004) http://www.nea.org.uk/Policy_&_Research/Policy_position 
_papers/Prepayment_Meters, accessed Apr. 13, 2005. 
9 For 2003, CAEM’s scored New Zealand as 1 on a 1–5 scale for retail switching, indicating a number in the 10–30 
percent range. More recent data from the New Zealand Electricity Commission on incumbent switching by supplier 
indicates switching rates between about 5 percent and 45 percent by network and “installation contact point,” with 
most still below 25 percent (http://www.electricitycommission.govt.nz/opdev/retail/regstats/regstatspdfs/incumbent/ 
incumbent-retailer-graph-jan05.pdf, accessed Apr. 14, 2005). However, time limitations prevented me from 
translating those figures into aggregate customer switching rates. 
10 http://www.consumer.org.nz/powerswitch/default.asp, accessed Apr. 14, 2005. 
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savings, otherwise the site estimates monthly consumption.11 It will then list the five least 
expensive suppliers and annual estimated costs, with separate lists depending on whether the 
electric company is able to control power to one’s water heater.12 The site also describes the 
process of switching, noting that it can take up to 29 working days, including coordinating an 
“event date” at which the actual or estimated meter reading is used by the old supplier to 
complete billing and the new supplier to commence it. These difficulties nevertheless ensued in a 
retail market rated as the second most successful in the world, suggesting that most consumers 
might find shopping for electricity more trouble than it’s worth. 
Alberta. CAEM scored Alberta only 61, as much below New Zealand as New Zealand is 
below England. At that, it exceeds all but three U.S. states, virtually tied with the fourth best, 
New York. So, one would view it as a relative success in retail electricity deregulation. Still, 
according to CAEM, only about 6 percent of residents in Alberta had switched from the 
incumbent by 2003.  
To help out residential consumers, Alberta’s Energy Utilities Board, its energy regulator, 
offers a “Customer Choice” Web site to reassure them that the process is “not as complex as 
many think.”13 The site offers customers a full-page, small-print “worksheet,” displayed below in 
Figure 1, to help them choose a provider, albeit with a disclaimer that “[t]he contents of this 
worksheet are only suggestions of possible considerations for consumers. This worksheet is not 
intended to be a comprehensive guide, nor is it a substitute for your own judgment.”14  
                                                 
11 In much of New Zealand, particularly the most populous city, Auckland, the climate is sufficiently mild and 
constant that many residences do not have air conditioning and only limited home heating. One might expect that 
monthly consumption does not vary greatly, although marginal supply costs could vary depending on the availability 
of hydropower across seasons.  
12 Ibid., with descriptions of the pricing plans available via the “Pricing Plans” link. 
13 Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, “Customer Choice,” http://www.customerchoice.gov.ab.ca/index.html, 
accessed Apr. 14, 2005. 
14 http://www.customerchoice.gov.ab.ca/Documents/Fact_Sheets/TalkAboutEnergy-Comparative_Shopping 
_Worksheet.pdf.  




 Figure 1: Alberta’s residential consumer worksheet  
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However, the Alberta regulators apparently believe that many consumers are not inclined 
to exercise this judgment. They have recently extended the regulated retail tariff for residential, 
farm, and small commercial customers from Dec. 15, 2005 until July 1, 2006, and even beyond 
that point, Albertans will be able to remain on a default service under which they pay the 
wholesale market price plus the transmission and distribution tariff.15 Even in the most open 
market in Canada, the preference of Albertans to avoid choice is not surprising to some industry 
observers. Cairine MacDonald, Deputy Minister for Management Services in British Columbia 
and former President of EPCOR Energy Services in Edmonton, has observed 
One of the outstanding questions is to what degree residential customers will want 
to exercise their choice in electricity. This is not a product with intrinsic 
differentiation. Even in the telecommunications market, where there were real and 
significant savings in long distance plans offered by competitors, the majority of 
customers remained with AT&T over ten years after deregulation. Customer 
inertia is even more of a reality for a product with little to distinguish options in 
terms of price savings or consumer benefits, although there are pricing, electricity 
source, and billing options which offer some elements of choice.  
Electricity will never be high on the customer radar screen except when prices 
are higher than anticipated, as has been the case in many of the jurisdictions going 
through deregulation, or where there are issues with reliability, customer service 
and billing (MacDonald 2003).  
MacDonald goes on to detail the set of rebates, price caps, and other reversals of retail 
deregulation instituted in the face of expected higher prices (particularly when close to dates of 
provincial elections) and difficulty of shopping with inaccurate or infrequent meter readings, 
particularly in rural areas. 
B. Domestic Examples 
Texas. CAEM scores Texas most recently at 69, below New Zealand but higher than any 
other U.S. state. Texas began offering consumers the right to choose a supplier in February 2001. 
For the 2003 RED Index, CAEM listed a retail switching rate of about 7.5 percent. As of 
September 2004, retail switching had increased to about 18 percent (Public Utility Commission 
of Texas (PUCT) 2005, 60).  This relatively low success rate—82 percent still not switching—
follows extensive efforts to educate the public, including radio advertising, media appearances, 
and “educational e-mails.” The “campaign” to persuade residents to consider a new supplier 
                                                 
15 Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, “EnerFAQs No. 7,” June, 2004: 4. 
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involved numerous civic organizations throughout the state (PUCT 2005, 39–40). The PUCT 
found that entrants “face several challenges” including increased customer protection 
requirements, “substantial customer acquisition costs” such as advertising and financial 
incentives, and costs of service centers dealing with billing, calling, and customer complaints 
(PUCT 2005, 60–61).  
The practical workings of the Texas retail market remain institutionally complex. The 
Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), acting as the independent system operator, 
manages customer switching in coordination with the local distribution company. It collects 
meter data from the distribution companies and forwards them to the designated retail energy 
provider. ERCOT reportedly has had difficulties carrying out these duties, resulting from 
software failures, database errors, and processing delays resulting in either multiple or no retail 
providers for some customers, with many not receiving bills for many months (Zarnikau 
2005,22–23).16 Part of the reason for increased switching rates, such as they are, may have been 
that the PUCT in 2004 raised the rates charged by some of the incumbents for default service 
and, in the words of PUCT chair Paul Hudson, told consumers that they “must shop for a better 
offer.”17
Pennsylvania. The wholesale market serving Pennsylvania, PJM, is touted as one of the 
most successful U.S. models.18 The retail experience has been less smooth, despite scoring just 
under Texas in the CAEM Red Index (67 compared with 69). All Pennsylvania customers were 
able to choose suppliers by January 2000.19 After an early peak of about 10 percent of customers 
switching in April 2001, participation dropped by almost two thirds by July 2003 (O’Donnell, 
                                                 
16 Despite the publication date of 2005, the article has a 2003 copyright and with most data ending by the end of 
2002. Matters may have improved, as the switching rate approximately doubled from the end of 2002 until 
Sept.2004 (PUCT 2005, 61). 
17 “Texas PUC Approves Three Rate Hikes, Tells Customers They Need to Shop to Save,” Power Markets Week 
(August 2, 2004): 16. 
18 Electric Power Supply Association, “New State of the Market Report Confirms Competitiveness, Continued 
Downward Pressure on Prices in PJM’s Power Markets,” Current Buzz (Mar. 18, 2005). However, one might take 
this as a cautionary tale. The thrust of the article is that the average load-weighted energy price fell by 4.2 percent, 
net of fuel costs. This may be the result of increased efficiency. But to the extent it reflects absorption of higher gas 
prices by the generating sector, it indicates that that sector had rents it could use to absorb those costs, suggesting 
some market power. 
19 National Energy Affordability and Accessibility Project, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
“Pennsylvania” (updated Nov. 20, 2003), http://neaap.ncat.org/restructuring/pa-re.htm, accessed Apr. 16, 2005. 
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Attanasio, and Shutran 2003).20 Consumer Reports called the reversal “a jolt of free-market 
reality [that was] a major setback for the Pennsylvania success story.”21
As with other jurisdictions, efforts to encourage consumers to switch illustrate some of 
the difficulty. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) distributes online a 
“Consumer’s Guide to Choosing an Electric Generation Supplier.”22 This guide features an 
eight-step form—the steps are described in Figure 2a—to fill out based on average usage (data 
supplied by the customer) and rate differentials to calculate monthly savings, somewhat akin to 
an IRS tax calculation worksheet. As shown in Figure 2b, it also includes a dozen “questions to 
ask electric generation suppliers” as one shops around.23 Two utilities have seen somewhat 
substantial switching rates (25 percent in one case, 10 percent in another), but switching from 
other utilities has been minuscule (O’Donnell, Attanasio, and Shutran 2003, 6). 
In response to these low rates, the PPUC has recently concluded that it needs somewhat 
permanent rules for offering “provider of last resort” or “default” service for customers who 
choose not to choose a supplier.24 The PPUC proposes that the incumbent local electric 
distribution company (EDC) in a particular area become the default provider, rather than hold a 
competitive auction to choose the lowest-cost supplier or adopt a single supplier statewide.25 The 
EDC would be directed to procure energy at wholesale through competitive bidding, although 
price need not be the only criterion for choosing suppliers. Default service prices would be set to 
recover energy, distribution, and customer service costs, with allowances for recovery of costs 
associated with consumer migration. Non-residential customers with peak demand exceeding 
500 kW will get service priced on an hourly basis. 
                                                 
20 The percentage figure is estimated from CAEM data; the actual peak figure was approximately 700,000 
customers.  
21 Consumer Reports.org, “Electricity: False Freedom,” July 2002. 
22 Council for Utility Choice, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/utilitychoice/downloads/electric/workbooke.pdf (June 
2003), accessed Apr. 16, 2005. 
23 Reginald Barua of the PPUA staff has pointed out that the source of the difficulties in implementing retail 
competition lies not with public utility commission policies as with the underlying enabling legislation, over which 
commissions have no authority. 
24 Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, “Proposed Rulemaking Order,” Rulemaking re Electric Distribution 
Companies’ Obligation to Serve Retail Customers at the Conclusion of the Transition Period Pursuant to 66 Pa. C.S. 
§2807(e)(2), Docket No. L-00040169, Dec. 16, 2004. 
25 An EDC could petition the PPUC to have the default service obligation removed. This would initiate an 
unspecified competitive process; the EDC could exit only if that process reached a “successful completion.” Ibid. at 
9. 
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Figure 2a: Eight Steps in Shopping for an Electricity Supplier 
 
Figure 2b: Questions to Ask Each Potential Supplier 
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Maine. Despite scoring third-highest of all the states (64) on CAEM’s index, CAEM 
reported very little retail switching as of 2003, just about 1 percent when it went to press. 
Thomas Welch (2003), chairman of the Maine Public Utilities Commission, reports that most of 
Maine’s load has switched to competitive suppliers, “nearly 50 percent” by the spring of 2002, 
but almost the entire switched load was from medium to large users. Reports by the end of 2002 
paint a different picture, indicating a switching rate of 10 percent, often to purchase green 
power.26  
Residential users are officially no longer served by their distribution utility but receive 
standard-offer service at regulated rates. The standard offer provider is the lowest-cost bidder for 
each service area, determined through periodic auctions held by the Maine Public Utilities 
Commission (MPUC) (Welch 2003). The residential switching rate remained quite low despite 
$1 million in consumer education efforts, including encouraging consumers to join private or 
public buying groups as well as to purchase electricity on their own (MPUC 2000).27 To avoid 
taking advantage of rate averaging, customers also have to pay an “opt-out fee” if they use 
standard-offer service for less than 12 months.28 MPUC’s Everybody’s Power Handbook 
contains a “Comparative Shopping Worksheet,” which does not include load estimates but does 
offer consumers a convenient way to specify the percentage of energy a supplier gets from up to 
nine fuel sources, not including “other” (MPUC 2000, 8). Switching rates may rise, as MPUC 
accepted bids for standard offer service that will have the effect of raising its price by 40 percent 
from March 2005 through February 2006.29
New York. The only other entity evaluated by CAEM with a RED Index score of at least 
60 is New York, which just hits that mark, placing it right below Alberta. According to CAEM, 
New York’s rate of switching fell from about 10 percent from 2000–2002 to a little more than 5 
percent in 2003. To help consumers, the New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) 
                                                 
26 Electricity Forum News, “Innovative Approaches to Deregulation in Maine” (Feb. 2003) http://www 
.electricityforum.com/news/feb03/mainedereg.html,  accessed Apr. 16, 2005. 
27 Ibid.; MPUC, Group Power: A Guide to Group Buying and Aggregation, http://mainegov-images.informe.org/ 
mpuc/industries/electricity/electric%20restructuring/GroupPower.pdf, accessed Apr. 16, 2005. 
28 MPUC, “‘Opt-Out Fee’ Frequently Asked Questions” (Apr. 2002), http://mainegov-images.informe.org/mpuc/ 
industries/electricity/ElectricSupplier/OptOutFactSheet20410.pdf, accessed Apr. 16, 2005. 
29 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, 
“Restructuring Status of Electric Markets, Maine” (updated Sept. 27, 2005), 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/femp/program/utility/utilityman_elec_me.cfm, accessed Nov. 8, 2005. 
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provides a “consumer guide” describing competition, highlighting green power options, and a 
checklist of factors (Figure 3 below) that consumers should consider.30 Consumers can learn 
about current offers in their area by going to the “Power to Choose” page on the NYPSC Web 
site, where by clicking on their incumbent utility, they can find matrices of offers including 
estimated monthly bills, contract terms, cancellation notices and fees, and other service options.31
On August 25, 2004, the NYPSC issued a “Policy Statement,” finding that “migration 
rates for small customers have lagged those of larger users” (NYPSC 2004, 2). As of February 
2005, 5.7 percent of eligible residential customer accounts had switched suppliers, compared to 
53.1 percent of large time-of-use based customers, representing 65.9 percent of load in that 
category and about 15 percent of the total load in the state.32 Switching rates vary widely across 
utility service areas in the state. Toward the low end, Consolidated Edison, serving most of New 
York City, has had about 2.6 percent of residential customers switch.  
At the high end, Orange and Rockland Utilities (ORU), has had a switching rate of nearly 
31 percent. ORU serves a triangle bordered on the east by the Hudson River, the north by the 
Catskills, and the southwest by New Jersey. Its high switching rate is attributed to a “Switch and 
Save” program (NYPSC 2004,15-16, Appendix D). New subscribers, who enroll through ORU, 
obtain a 7 percent discount for two months. These customers are assigned to competing 
electricity service companies (ESCOs) randomly. ORU purchases back the accounts receivable 
of these customers “without recourse,” which means that ORU cannot bill the ESCO for failures 
to pay. Thus, the ESCOs apparently are insulated from initial nonpayment liability. NYPSC is 
considering other options to encourage migration, including auctioning off customers from the 
utilities to ESCOs; those customers would then have the option of returning to the incumbent or 
switching to another ESCO (NYPSC 2004,27–28). The NYPSC’s Policy Statement stopped 
short of forcing consumers to move to an ESCO (NYPSC 2004, 23–24).
                                                 
30 New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC), “Your Energy… Your Choice: A PSC Consumer Guide,” 
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/UseYourPowerToChoose.pdf, page 8, accessed Apr. 12, 2005. 
31 NYPSC, “Power to Choose,” http://www.askpsc.com/campaigns/?action=viewCampaign&id=1047, accessed 
Apr. 16, 2005. 
32 NYPSC, “February 2005 NYS Electric Retail Access Migration Reports,” 
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/Electric_RA_Migration.htm, accessed Apr. 16, 2005. 
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Figure 3: New York’s Electricity Consumer Checklist 
 
III. Modeling Implications 
A. Choosing Not to Choose  
The settings described here are among the most successful implementations of retail 
competition, yet their success in the residential sector is limited at best. The nature and breadth 
of the efforts to attempt to encourage residential competition suggest that consumers regard 
competition as less than transparent. Virtually all jurisdictions recognize a need to educate 
consumers as to the virtues of getting to choose an electricity supplier. Most offer guides and 
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checklists to help consumers make price comparisons and to obtain information on terms and 
conditions of the contracts, and most recognize a need to offer “provider of last resort” or 
“default” service for consumers who refuse to choose. In New York, successful “choice” is 
obtained by having entrants obtain consumer accounts directly from incumbents, forcing 
consumers to choose to stay with the entrant, return to the incumbent, or pick another supplier.  
By conventional economic norms, such behavior appears puzzling. Buyers are supposed 
to welcome competition for the opportunity to choose a most preferred alternative under a 
process that forces prices as close to cost as can reasonably be expected. This does appear to be 
the case for large buyers, where switching rates in many jurisdictions appear significant. Were 
that the case in general, however, one presumably would not need extensive educational efforts, 
worksheets, initial forced reallocation to entrants, and rules and regulations for default service, 
particularly for residential customers.  
That these efforts and policies appear necessary suggests that to some degree and for 
many, if not most residential customers, increasing choice in and of itself entails a welfare loss. 
This cannot be attributed to higher prices; in many cases, choice in fact does allow one to do 
better than one can with the incumbent or default service. Consumers may prefer the old regime 
if moving to competition causes all prices to rise, but that in and of itself should not make retail 
choice less valuable. 
An obvious candidate for cost of competition would be search. Search costs may play a 
significant role, particularly in terms of assessing non-price aspects of additional alternative 
services. At least in terms of online information availability, the marginal cost of finding out a 
second alternative’s price is fairly low, once one has done the research necessary to obtain a first 
price. But it is that initial level of research, indicated by the worksheets, checklists, and sample 
questionnaires, which indicates a high fixed cost for even having to use a market at all.  
Such costs can lead to adverse outcomes, with prices for each nominally competitive firm 
potentially as great as the monopoly price, even if the investment in search allows one to learn 
everyone’s costs (Salop and Stiglitz 1977). However, the problem in retail electricity markets is 
not simply a matter of customers choosing to search among competitors prior to purchasing a 
good. It is that they already had a supplier—the regulated incumbent distribution utility. Hence, 
being asked to switch can make them worse off than they were before, even if the resulting price 
were no lower than what would have ensued under continued regulation.  
As Cairine MacDonald has noted, electricity may be a particularly homogenous good, 
hence with little reason to switch absent the prospect of a lower price. However, the problem 
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may be more endemic. In touting the success of its relatively high switching rate, OFGEM notes 
that consumers switch electricity suppliers considerably more often than they do banks, telecom 
companies, mortgage lenders, or home insurers.33 This comparison begs a question of whether 
consumers are generally resistant to switching and whether a policy move to encourage 
switching in other sectors would be equally costly.  
Consumers appear generally reluctant to switch in many areas. Littlechild (2005) reports 
that after 20 years of opportunity to choose different telephone service providers, 82 percent of 
residential access lines remain with the incumbent in Britain. Walker Information (2004) and 
Pombriant (2004) reported that about 75 percent of customers viewed themselves as loyal to a 
variety of information technology products, either out of high opinion for the product or because 
they felt locked in despite not liking the product. Only 3 percent of customers were viewed as 
“accessible” to competitors. In surveying brand loyalty of food, beverage, and other products, 
The Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) reported that 67 percent of respondents would 
“‘chase [a national] brand’ to a different store it wasn’t available or do without until the next 
shopping excursion.”34  
GMA found that loyalty to brands appears positively related to both income and 
education.35 The opportunity cost of time allocated to search may outweigh the potential reduced 
cost in processing the information obtained via search. GMA also suggests that brand loyalty is 
also associated with differentiation.36 This is contrary to suggestions that homogeneity in 
electricity makes customers likely to switch. Habituation or aversion to risk in supply of an 
essential product may outweigh the gains from simply basing purchases on easily obtained price 
information. Electricity differentiation in terms of service contracts (terms, cancellation fees) 
may create a competitive advantage for the incumbent or default provider.  
                                                 
33 OFGEM, “Competition in Gas and Electricity Supply,” note 2 above. The OFGEM report contains an 
inconsistency, citing a 38 percent switching rate for electricity in the text yet graphing only a 28 percent switching 
rate. For purposes of the discussion and because OFGEM subsequently reported higher switching rates, I assume the 
rate in the text is correct and the graph incorrect. 
34 GMA, “New Survey Shows National Brand Loyalty High Among American Consumers,” Press release, June 12, 
2002, http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/newsrelease_p.cfm?DocID=971, accessed Apr. 17, 2005.   
35 GMA, “Branding the ‘Ultimate Consumer,’ New GMA/Roper Starch Report Reveals Traits of Consumers Loyal 
to National Brands,” Press Release, Sep. 6, 2000, http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/newsrelease_p.cfm?DocID 
=619, accessed Apr. 17, 2005. 
36 Ibid. 
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B. Possible Representations 
As noted above, costs of acquiring information have long been recognized as a factor in 
distorting markets (Salop and Stiglitz 1977). Customers with low information costs will get a 
competitive price at minimum average costs, but if there are enough consumers with sufficiently 
high information costs, it will pay some or all providers to sell reduced levels of output at a high 
monopolistic price that just covers a higher average cost. Here, as noted above, the setting is 
somewhat different, in that we begin with customers who already have a supplier. The effect is 
important, in that the incumbent already has the capacity to sell a large amount and the entrants 
would all be appealing to the low-cost sellers. They might be expected to evaluate retail 
electricity markets not by comparing them to the absence of any supply, but to the previous case 
where supply was available from a single supplier at a regulated price. This suggests that the 
entrants’ price would be relatively low, with the incumbent able to earn no more than the rents 
from search. 
This analysis suggests a setting to examine whether retail competition is beneficial. 
Suppose there are N customers, with M < N having relatively high search costs F. Define the 
following three retail prices for electricity: 
PR: The regulated price 
PI: The price the incumbent can charge to those who find search costly 
PC: The competitive price charged to those customers with less aversion to going into the 
electricity market; assume for convenience that this equals a constant cost C.  
We can assume that PC is dictated by cost conditions and competition; N – M consumers with 
low search costs obtain their supplies at PC in an open retail market.  
Assume that PR reflects some capture or production inefficiency indicated by the 
parameter X, so that  
 P R = PC[1 + X] = C[1 + X]. 
PI is set endogenously by the incumbent selling to the M customers who reluctant to switch. For 
modeling convenience, assume that we can order the M consumers such that the amount that any 
consumer i purchases at price p, Q(i, p), increases with i. With costs equal to C, the incumbent 
sets PI to maximize profits ΠI from the K(PI) low demand customers who purchase from it; the 
M – K(PI) high demand customers find it worthwhile to incur search. 
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The first term is the increased revenue from selling output at a higher price. The second term is 
the reduction in output from reduced demand. The first term in the brackets is the reduced sales 
from customers who elect to search rather than pay the higher price; the second term is the 
reduced sales from the customers still reluctant to search.37  
Opening markets thus has three effects on consumers: 
1. The N – M with low search costs each gain surplus because PC < PR. If j indexes these 
consumers in order of increasing demand, their welfare gain is given by 








2. The K(PI) consumers who stick with the incumbent lose, if PI > PR. Their welfare loss 
is given by38
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.  
38 Note that the demand function Q in this integral is different from that immediately above, because the set of 
consumers with high search costs need not be the same size nor have the same demand as those with low search 
costs. 
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3. The overall welfare effect on the M – K(PI) high demand, high search-cost consumers 
who leave the incumbent is ambiguous. They get a lower price than they had under 
regulation, but only by incurring a cost F to avoid paying the high PI. Because 
PR < PI, at least some of these consumers are worse off despite switching, and all of 
them might be. The effect in the aggregate is 








Opening markets can reduce consumer welfare if the losses to the high-cost consumers, 
either those who switch or those who remain with the incumbent, exceed the gains to the low-
cost consumers who switch. To incorporate aggregate welfare effects, one would want to add to 
the (possibly negative) net effect on consumers the profits gained by the incumbent in raising 
price. A more important effect is likely to be the cost reductions from introducing potentially 
more efficient entrants into the market and any reductions in cost that the incumbent institutes as 
it is able to collect profits. However, this model suggests that it is hardly impossible for opening 
markets to reduce welfare for customers for whom shopping is unwelcome. 
One could modify this model in a variety of ways. A very simple variation would be to 
assume that all consumers buy at PC but that all bear costs of doing so, simply from having to 
add electricity choice to the set of things they now have to deal with.39 If on average the 
“dealing” costs exceed the surplus gain in moving from the regulated price, opening markets 
reduces welfare. One could strengthen the case for opening markets, e.g., by allowing product 
differentiation and allowing searchers to gain more by finding more preferred products from new 
entrants. Further modifications that allow for market power among the differentiated entrants 
would tilt the other way.  
                                                 
39 Cognition costs can affect how much normative weight to place on market outcomes (Brennan 1994, 159–60). 
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IV. Policy Commentary 
Concerns regarding the state of the retail markets go back certainly to the beginnings of 
the market-opening era in electricity, predating such crises as the 2000–01 market implosion in 
California and the August 2003 Northeast blackout. In 1998, the National Conference on State 
Legislatures published a report suggesting that consumer education would be necessary for low-
usage customers who “may not have the time or resources to fully understand or research their 
options” (Brown, Eisenberg, and Hill 1998). The report noted that during a pilot retail 
competition program in New Hampshire, many consumers “said that they felt overwhelmed by 
the array of choices available to them.” The report additionally recommended simple, 
standardized billing. It suggested that aggregators—municipalities, churches, credit unions, or 
other “affinity groups” could do the researching and buying. The report took for granted that 
there will be a default provider to serve “customers that do not choose a new supplier.” 
Even these early recommendations called into question some potential benefits of retail 
competition. Standardized billing can make choosing easier. Doing so, however, substantially 
limits the degree to which entrants can differentiate themselves through fee structures, real time 
pricing or rate averaging, cancellation fees, contract length, and the like. Aggregation may be 
useful, but in theory the formation could and is left to markets in general without regulatory 
mandate or encouragement, if they are cost-effective means for procuring electricity. Grocery 
stores, for example, might be thought of as “food aggregators,” and consumers can shop around 
for who does the most preferred “aggregating” along the price/quality continuum. Implicit in the 
advocacy for aggregation is the idea that the aggregator would become the default provider, 
taking over the choice role for its consumer members. 
Beginning by quoting Woody Allen that “it’s a sin to buy retail,” Paul Joskow in 2000 
argued that incumbent distribution companies should offer retail customers a “Basic Electricity 
Service” (BES) passing through ostensibly competitive wholesale energy prices (Joskow 2000). 
Entrants would compete by coming up with value-added services such as bundling with other 
utilities, green power, hedging, and energy management. If they cannot—and Joskow appears 
skeptical that they can—it would be inefficient for policymakers to set “shopping credits” above 
the wholesale price or to provide subsidies in order to encourage switching away from the BES. 
Steven Littlechild (2000) has disagreed, arguing that retail competition can reduce prices and 
provide a wider variety of hedging options. The market can provide BES if consumers want it. 
The debate between Joskow and Littlechild turns on whether consumers are better off given a 
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reasonable passive choice, or if they should exercise their preference through active supplier 
selection. 
Around the same time Theresa Flaim, then Vice President for Strategic Planning at 
Niagara Mohawk, noted the lack of consumer interest in switching, even in Pennsylvania where 
switching was “deliberately subsidized” (Flaim 2000). She attributed this to both economics—
the absence of value added service relative to the transaction costs of serving small customers, 
and policy conflicts—the tension between opening markets, encouraging switching, and 
insulating residential buyers from price volatility and price increases. She notes that “forcing” 
retail competition absent identifiable benefits is not worth it, in part because of real “customer 
search and hassle costs” (Flaim 2000, 52). For political and legal as well as economic reasons, 
she recommends a default service based on spot prices without hedging similar to Joskow’s BES, 
most likely provided by the incumbent utility; entrants can provide hedged contract prices if 
consumers demand it.  
Other observers have reached similar conclusions. Weil (2000) has argued that even after 
efforts to educate consumers and protect them against misleading claims or market power, 
residential users will need a default provider as “many people are indifferent to potential price 
savings because they do not want to deal with another choice.” Jurewitz (2002) noted that default 
provision, particularly under traditional averaged prices, will leave consumers “largely 
uneducated and incompetent to cope with [market] forces at the end of the transition period” to 
full competition. However, opening retail markets “overnight” is not feasible because of 
consumer inertia and the political consequences of higher prices or unserved customers during 
switching periods. To promote the development of retail competition, which he still regarded as a 
policy goal, he offered design principles including making default service less attractive over 
time, high back-and-forth switching costs, and separation of low-income assistance obligations.  
 
V. Conclusion 
“The best policy is to declare victory and leave.” 
Senator George D. Aiken (R-Vt.), 1966, about the Viet Nam War 
The evidence, empirical, theoretical, and expert, that opening residential electricity 
markets to competition may hurt consumers because of the costs they perceive of having to 
choose is compelling. Even the best jurisdictions, with the possible exception of England, have 
seen low switching rates. A key reason why one might need a default provider is not merely that 
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electricity is “different,” but that the rapid transition to open markets would force consumers to 
switch when they are reluctant to do so in general. A model with costs of switching away from 
an incumbent indicates that net welfare effects, taking switching/search costs into account, can 
be negative. Those who remain with the incumbent rather than switch have to pay higher prices, 
and those with high costs who do switch nevertheless may have been better off with the 
unregulated price. Considerable commentary bears out these concerns. 
Perhaps these conclusions are pessimistic, in that as states rescind “standard offer” prices 
enacted in the initial stages of retail restructuring, more entry and switching may be forthcoming, 
particularly if “provider of last resort obligations” charges incorporate a premium to reflect the 
risk of customer churn and nonpayment.40 Nevertheless, the analyses above suggest some policy 
recommendations. A first would be to realize that much of the value of opening electricity 
markets will be achieved in offering choice to industrial and commercial users. The residential 
portion of the market in the United States comprises only about 36.4 percent of total electricity 
use.41 Competition for the other 63.6 percent will not only be beneficial on its own but could also 
lead to lower benchmark prices for residential customers. Over time, residential users might 
overcome reluctance to choose if it appears to be bringing benefits to other parts of the sector. 
But until that point, rather than lament the failure of small users to jump on the competition 
bandwagon, electricity market advocates might follow Senator Aiken’s advice and declare 
victory. 
Such a declaration entails that consumers continue to be offered a default alternative. The 
model suggests that a primary cost of that alternative will be that a default provider would have 
the market power to capture the rents from consumer reluctance to choose. Consequently, for 
economic as well as political reasons, one may not only need to designate a default provider to 
avoid forcing consumers to make choices they would rather not (Sutherland 2001). That default 
provider may also need to have its prices regulated so that it is unable to exploit its privileged 
position. In the model, the closer the incumbent’s price PI is to the regulated price PR, the less 
                                                 
40 The model in Section III.B above indicates that switching induced by higher incumbent prices may not increase 
economic welfare relative to regulation. 
41 Calculated from U.S. Department of Energy data on electricity use by sector for 2004, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
cneaf/electricity/epm/table5_1.html, accessed Apr. 18, 2005. Colin Loxley, Director, Resource Planning, Public 
Service Enterprise Group of New Jersey, reports that 60 percent of the total load in New Jersey is served by 
competitive suppliers.  
21 Resources for the Future  Brennan 
high search—costs consumers will be harmed by opening markets.42 This explains why the 
political bargain for opening markets typically includes retail price ceilings, if not cuts. But one 
needs to be sure that price ceilings do not insulate consumers from facing real increases in 
wholesale costs to prevent a repeat of the inelastic demand and bankruptcies substantially 
responsible for the California 2000–01 crisis (Brennan 2001).  
A last set of lessons is methodological. Economics paradigmatically assumes that choice 
is always preferred. This entails that consumers do not find competition inherently costly rather 
than transparent. The experience in electricity—and before that in telecommunications—
suggests that consumers do not always regard open choice as a favor. A look at the marketing 
literature suggests that consumers in general have a limited propensity to reevaluate the choices 
of all the goods in their consumption bundle; only a few may be up for competitive grabs at any 
one time. If economics is to take revealed preference seriously, it should do so when the revealed 
preference is not to have to choose.  
A policy implication is that interference with markets may be justified outside of the 
usual market failure categories of market power, externalities, or asymmetric information. 
Regulation of a franchised monopoly, or public provision, may well be justified if the gains from 
competition and differentiated entry are less than the costs of search. For relatively 
undifferentiated products where the costs of error in supplier choice from unreliability are large, 
it may well economize on search and certification costs to let the public sector do the searching 
and buying rather than for each of us to do so ourselves, even if the relevant markets are quite 
competitive. 
 
                                                 
42 This could arise not just from a low PI but also from a high PR due to regulation-induced inefficiency, i.e., a high 
K value in the model. 
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